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Estate Planning for the Disposition of
Control of a Family Corporation*
I. INTRODUCTION
Buy-sell agreements and recapitalizations are familiar meth-
ods of transferring corporate control in close corporations. How-
ever, where the vast majority of shares is owned by members
of the same family and the transfer is to be from father to son,
these plans encounter several problems which do not occur when
the shareholders are unrelated. For example, if a plan calls for
the redemption of stock from a deceased shareholder's estate, the
tax attribution rules operating on the close family relationship
may cause the entire corporate distribution received in the trans-
action to be treated as ordinary income. In addition, corporate
manipulation to suit the controlling shareholder's estate planning
needs, rather than corporate needs or the needs of nonfamily
interests, may well meet opposition from corporate creditors and
minority shareholders. Indeed, designing corporate changes to
accommodate the diverse personal requirements of a controlling
shareholder's beneficiaries presents a problem in itself. It is
the purpose of this Note to examine some of the difficulties
faced by the estate planner who must devise a buy out or recapi-
talization to transfer a controlling interest from father to son
in a family corporation.
Throughout the following discussion it will be assumed for
the purpose of illustration that the client's corporation has
1,000 outstanding shares of common stock divided as follows: the
client-testator owns 750 shares, his adult son owns 150 shares,
and an unrelated employee of the corporation, X, owns 100 shares.
The corporation is worth $1,000,000, and each share has a cost
basis of $100. The testator is married and has two children, the
son and a daughter. The corporation is most valuable as a going
concern, and testator's stock will be the principal asset of his
estate. While this latter postulation will often prove untrue,
it is useful here in order to highlight possible liquidity problems
arising upon testator's death. The testator has two principal
objectives: he wishes to pass control of the corporation to his
son who is skilled in, and has participated in, the management
of the business; and he wants his interest in the corporation to
* This Note won the First Prize in the 1968 Estate Planning
Competition sponsored by the First National Bank of Chicago. Permis-
sion to reproduce this Note must be obtained from the First National
Bank.
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provide for his widow and daughter.
II. BUY OUTS
A. ENTiTY Buy OuTs
The entity buy out provides a mechanically simple device for
carrying out the testator's wishes.' Upon his death, the corpor-
ation purchases testator's stock from his estate,2 thereby leaving
his son in control of the corporation. The estate then uses
the proceeds from the sale to satisfy testator's bequests and
legacies to his wife and daughter. The plan insures a market for
testator's stock, thus eliminating potential liquidity problems,
and the surviving shareholders have no fear of an outsider's
buying into the corporation.
Funding the buy out may present a problem, since the death
of a shareholder could occur prematurely when the corporation is
without enough capital surplus to make the agreed purchase.
Moreover, in the present case it would be extremely difficult for
the corporation to buy three quarters of a million dollars worth
of stock even if testator lived out his expected life span. Also,
the accumulation of a surplus large enough to fund the purchase
might subject the corporation to the accumulated earnings tax.3
1. The mechanics of buy out agreements have been the subject of
much comment. See, e.g., Gordon, Buyi.ng Out the Deceased Co-Ad-
venturer: The Use of Insurance, N.Y.U. 19TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 673
(1961); Hull, Advantages of Cross-Purchase Plan Over Redemption in
Certain Situations, 14 J. TAxATIoN 84 (3.961); Neuhoff, Life Insurance
Funding of Business Buy-Out Agreements, 25 Mo. L. REv. 3 (1960);
Weinstock, Stock Purchase Agreements, 4C TAXES 561 (1962).
2. State law may impose restrictions on the purchase by a cor-
poration of its own stock. See Note, Stock Repurchase Abuses and
the No Prejudice Rule, 59 YALE L.J. 1177, 1182-83 (1950) (general sur-
vey). In addition, almost all states place restrictions on the funds
from which redemptions can be made. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CoRP. ACT §§ 5, 60 (1950); MAinN. STAT. § 301.22(6) (1965).
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-37 [hereinafter cited by section
number only]. Section 532 provides that the accumulated earnings tax
shall apply where corporate earnings and profits are accumulated "for
the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders
...." Section 533 provides that accumulations "beyond the reasonable
needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid
the income tax ...... Thus a question exists as to whether accumu-
lations for the purpose of redeeming the interest of the controlling
shareholder of a close corporation are beyond the reasonable needs of
the business. Resolution of this question requires that inquiry be made
into whether accumulations for redemption serve a corporate purpose, as
opposed to a shareholder or other purpose, and therefore satisfy a
business need. Whether the retention of earnings is for the redemption
of a majority or minority shareholder has sometimes been deemed a
crucial fact in finding a corporate purpose. See Gazette Pub. Co. v. Self,
103 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Ark. 1952); Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commis-
1020 [Vol. 52:1019
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Normally, such agreements are funded by insurance. Under
an entity buy out funded by insurance,4 the corporation insures
the lives of its shareholders naming itself as beneficiary.5 While
sioner, 28 T.C. 153 (1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958) (accumu-
lation to redeem majority shareholder's interest held unreasonable);
Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939) (accumulations to redeem a minor-
ity shareholder's interest held not unreasonable). Where a conflict
exists between two groups of shareholders, each owning 50% of a close
corporation's stock, it has been held that accumulations by the corpora-
tion to buy out one group served a corporate purpose. Mountain State
Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).
See § 537; Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 322 F.2d 576 (5th
Cir. 1963); Sterling Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 313 F.2d 803 (5th
Cir. 1963); Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951);
Penn Needle Art Co., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 504 (1958).
For a general discussion of the problem, see Herwitz, Stock Re-
demptions and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 74 IiARv. L. REv. 866,
900-31 (1961); Maxfield, Recent Cases Forecast More Liberal Trend in
Allowing Accumulation to Redeem Stock, 25 J. TAXATIoN 43 (1966).
4. See Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial In-
terest in a Closely Held Business-Part Three-The Corporation: Stock-
Purchase Agreements and Redemption of Shares, 46 IowA L. REv. 516,
519-20 (1961) (problems of funding without insurance); Note, A Closer
Look at Disability "Buy-Outs" for the Close Corporation, 52 1MNW. L.
REv. 483, 484-86 (1967) (funding without insurance in disability buy out
context); Note, The Use of Life Insurance to Fund Agreements Provid-
ing for Disposition of a Business Interest at Death, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 687,
688 (1958).
5. Under no circumstances should testator retain incidents of own-
ership in the policy, or the proceeds plus his stock interest will be
included in his gross estate. Section 2042. This may pose a problem
when the son predeceases testator. If the testator has the power to
change beneficiaries upon the occurrence of that contingency, he has a§ 2042 incident of ownership. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2) (1966).
See Stern, Buy-Sell Agreements, N.Y.U. 19TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 653,
675 (1961).
For accumulated earnings tax purposes, it is advisable not to tie the
purchase of insurance by the corporation to the redemption of any
particular shareholders's stock because a showing of a business purpose,
as opposed to a purely shareholder purpose, seems to be a prerequisite
to a finding of a reasonable business need. See note 3 supra. One
method of accomplishing this is the purchase of "key-man" insurance
by the corporation to protect itself against the loss of valuable personnel.
While the buildup of cash values would be deemed the retention of
earnings, a valid business need could easily be shown. To characterize
the retention of earnings in this manner is not without problems, how-
ever. For example, in the hypothetical posed, the value of the loss of
testator's services may well be less than the value of his stock, in
which case there will be insufficient funds for a complete redemption.
If more insurance is purchased than is needed to cover the loss of
testator's services, the benefit of this plan may be lost. The fact that
the declared purpose of accumulations is to provide for the loss of
key men is not binding on the Commissioner if the funds are in fact
used for a redemption. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69-70,
stated:
If the retention of earnings is justified as of the close of the
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its payment of the premiums is not deductible,6 the premiums
are paid with once-taxed dollars rather than twice-taxed dollars,
which would be the case were the shareholders to insure each
others' lives, paying the premiums themselves. Even so, the
annual premiums on a million do]lars of life insurance will
amount to thousands of dollars7 and may reduce corporate income
after their payment to an unacceptable level. Also, the cash
value of the policies will be subject to the claims of corporate
creditors. On the other hand, receipt of the insurance proceeds is
tax-free.8 The agreement as to the price at which the corpora-
tion will purchase testator's stock rnay fix its value for estate
taxable year, subsequent events should not be used for the pur-
pose of showing that the retention was unreasonable in such
year. However, subsequent events may be considered to deter-
mine whether the corporation actually intended to consummate
the plans for which the earnings were accumulated.
6. Section 264(a) (1). There is a danger that the Commissioner
might contend the payment of premiums by the corporation constitute
dividends to the son and X, because the effect of the transaction is
tantamount to the son and X taking out the policy on testator's life
and having the corporation pay the premiums.
In Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947), a close
corporation controlled by the taxpayer assumed the personal obligation
of the taxpayer to buy out another shareholder. It was held that pay-
ments by the corporation on the assumed contract constituted divi-
dends to the taxpayer. Cf. Paramount-Richards Theaters, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946) (policy could not be reached
by corporate creditors). Other cases have held, however, that where a
corporation insures the life of its majority shareholder, payment of the
premiums does not constitute dividends to those who will have control
following that shareholder's death and the purchase of his interest by
the corporation. See, e.g., Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958);
Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Prunier v. Com-
missioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957). These cases have been affirmed
by the Treasury. Rev. Rul. 614, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 920. See Rev. Rul.
184, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 65; Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 89 (1958) (and
cases there cited). The Wall case would seem to present problems only
where the corporation assumes a cross -purchase buy out arrangement,
thus rendering it a trap only for the uninformed.
7. See Flitcraft Compend, published by Flitcraft, Inc., which com-
piles current life insurance rates. Term insurance may be a partial
solution to the problem of high premiums, as may the transfer of exist-
ing policies where testator is uninsurable.
8. Section 101(a) (1). There is little chance that the Commis-
sioner will claim that purchase of testator's interest constitutes a divi-
dend to the surviving shareholders because their respective interests in
the corporation are increased by the redemption. Rev. Rul. 614, 1958-2
Cum. BULL. 920, provides:
[T]he Service will not treat the purchase by a corporation of
one shareholder's stock as a dividend to the remaining share-
holders merely because their percentage interests in the corpora-
tion are increased. On the other hand, if the stock is in reality
purchased by a remaining shareholder and paid for by the cor-
poration, then, regardless of the form of the transaction, the
[Vol. 52:10191022
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tax purposes.0 And the plan as a whole preserves to the stock-
holders the opportunity to make a subchapter S election, because
it does not create a new class of stock nor give rise to a nonindi-
vidual stockholder.10
While insurance appears to be a practical way to handle the
funding problem," difficulties may arise where, as here, there is
a great disparity between the ages of the stockholders and the
sizes of their respective interests. For instance, the premium
payments will be paid from corporate income, in which the son
and X both have a substantial salary interest. Yet the bulk of
the insurance cost will be attributable to the much larger policy
on testator's life. Consequently, the son and X will in effect
be subsidizing part of the testator's portion of the buy out. The
son and X, however, will gain a substantially greater interest in
the corporate assets following testator's death. Similarly, testa-
tor, who in all likelihood will die first, will not realize his
proportionate share of the increase in corporate worth due to
the corporation's receipt of insurance proceeds at his death. 2 To
payment will be considered a dividend to the shareholder who
made the purchase.
This ruling followed Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir.
1958); Zipp v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1958). Accord,
Rev. Rul. 286, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL 103.
9. The problems of valuation of closely held stock have been
thoroughly discussed by commentators elsewhere. See, e.g., A.J. CAS-
NEER, ESTATE PLANNING 942-53 (3d ed. 1961); Bomeli, Valuation of
Closely Held Securities for Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 6 TAX CouN-
SEL Q. 145 (1962); Conway, Valuation of Stock in a Close Corporation for
Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 188 (1963); Weyher,
Providing for Succession Through Buy-Sell Agreements and Recapitali-
zations, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAx. 445, 466 (1963); Comment,
Valuation of Securities in a Close Corporation for Federal Estate Tax
Purposes, 8 Vn.L. L. REv. 92 (1962).
10. See §§ 1371-77. A corporation meeting the subchapter S re-
quirements can elect to be taxed as a partnership. Section 1371 limits
the types of corporations which may elect under subchapter S to those
which do not
(1) have more than 10 shareholders;(2) have as a shareholder a person (other than an estate) who
is not an individual;
(4) have more than one class of stock.
11. See Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial
Interest in a Closely Held Business-Part Three-The Corporation:
Stock-Purchase Agreements and Redemption of Shares, 46 IowA L.
REv. 516 (1961); Stoeber, Stock Redemption vs. Cross-Purchase Agree-
ments in Closely-Held Corporations, 17 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. 212 (1963);
Note, The Use of Life Insurance To Fund Agreements Providing for
Disposition of a Business Interest at Death, 71 HARV. L. REV. 687, 688-91
(1958).
12. Receipt of proceeds in excess of the amount of premiums
paid will increase the corporation's earnings and profits, thereby in-
19681 1023
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illustrate, the corporation will be worth approximately $1,000,000
plus the $750,000 insurance proceeds at testator's death. Though
testator's interest in the corporation is 75% of this sum, his
stock will be purchased, absent provisions to the contrary, for
only $750,000. Likewise, and again absent provisions to the
contrary, testator's estate will not share in the increase in cor-
porate worth due to the cash values of the policies on X and the
son. Formulas exist which include the insurance proceeds and
the cash values of the surviving shareholders' policies in valuing
a testator's interest prior to purchase, 3 but these do not take into
account such factors as the decrease in the corporation's value
attributable to the shareholder's death. While such formulas are
helpful, they are not a panacea.
Sections 302 and 318 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
pose a most serious drawback to the entity buy out of testator's
interest. Section 302 determines when a redemption of a share-
holder's interest by a corporation will be deemed a sale and the
gain given capital gains treatment, and when a redemption will
be deemed to be a distribution essentially equivalent to a dividend
and subject to ordinary income treatment. Under section 302, a
redemption will result in capital gains treatment only if (1) it
is not essentially equivalent to a dividend,14 or (2) it is substan-
tially disproportionate to the shareholder's prior interest, 5 or
(3) it is a complete termination of the shareholder's interest in
the corporation. 16 It would be a relatively easy task to create an
estate plan which would meet one or more of these criteria if
section 302 did not specifically provide that the attribution rules
of section 318 shall apply in determining whether the above tests
have been met. Section 318 provides that an individual shall be
deemed constructively to own stock owned by members of his
family. It further provides that stock owned by an estate will
be deemed to be owned constructively by the estate's beneficiaries
and, conversely, that stock owned by the beneficiaries of an
estate will be deemed to be owned by the estate.17
The consequences of applying these sections to the hypotheti-
creasing the amount available for dividends. Rev. Rul. 230, 1954-1
Cum. BuLL. 114.
13. The Churchill Principle provides one means of valuation
which takes into account the insurance proceeds. See Churchill, Achiev-
ing Equity Under Entity Purchase Agreements (Research and Review
Service, Inc., Indianapolis, Ind. 1955).
14. Section 302 (b) (1).
15. Section 302(b) (2).
16. Section 302(b) (3).
17. Section 318(a) (1) & (2).
1024 [Vol. 52:1019
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cal situation now under consideration are as follows. Assuming
the wife to be a beneficiary of testator's estate, upon testator's
death the son's 150 shares will be attributed to his mother, and,
in turn, this interest will be attributed to the estate. Conse-
quently, the estate will be deemed to own constructively all the
stock in the corporation except that interest owned by X. After
the corporation redeems testator's stock from his estate, the
estate will still constructively own the son's 150 shares.18 Hence
with regard to the termination of interest test the redemption
will not be a complete termination of the estate's interest, and,
if the proceeds are not to be treated as the receipt of a dividend,
they must qualify under another of the alternative provisions
of section 302.
The "substantially disproportionate" test of section 302(b) (2)
(B) provides that a redemption will not be substantially dispro-
portionate with respect to the redeeming shareholder unless he
owns less than 50 per cent of the combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote following the redemption. Section
302 (b) (2) (C) adds a second requirement that a redemption is not
substantially disproportionate unless there is a decrease of more
than 20 per cent in the voting control of the shareholder whose
stock is redeemed. In the present case, the estate's constructive
voting control is 90 per cent before the redemption and afterwards
150 of 250 shares, or 60 per cent. While this meets the second
requirement, it does not meet the first because the estate still
has more than 50 per cent of voting control.
It would appear that the 50 per cent requirement can never
be satisfied where testator's spouse is a beneficiary of his estate
and the son must have control following the redemption. The
son must ultimately own more than 50 per cent of the voting
stock in order to be in control, and the attribution rules will
attribute this interest through the mother to the estate. Conse-
quently, the estate will always constructively own more than
50 per cent of voting control following the redemption.19
18. The problems raised by the application of the § 318 attribution
rules to § 302 redemptions are discussed at length in Note, Stock Re-
demptions From Close Family Corporations Under Section 302, 47
MVnN. L. REv. 853 (1963). Though § 302(c) (2) provides a waiver of
the attribution rules in the § 302(b) (3) termination of interest situa-
tion, only the family attribution rules may be waived and not the
entity attribution rules. Rev. Rul. 233, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 106. Hence
the son's stock must be attributed to the estate.
19. In a situation where a redemption by testator's estate could
meet the termination of interest provision of § 302 if it were not for the
fact that bequests to nonfamily beneficiaries will be attributed to the
19681
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The final way to avoid ordinary gain on the redemption lies
in the "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" test of section
302 (b) (1). Judicial construction of this section and its predeces-
sor under the 1939 Code emphasizes the "net effect" of the distri-
bution and whether or not it has a legitimate business purpose.20
While many factors are considered as relevant under the net
effect test,21 the most important one is whether the redemption
causes a change in the proportionate voting position of the share-
holder receiving the distribution.22 For example, a pro rata
distribution to all shareholders in no way alters respective voting
control, and for this reason such a distribution would be taxed
as a dividend. Cases have extended this reasoning to non-pro
rata redemptions which cause only slight change in the voting
control of the recipient by calling them essentially pro rata.23
When the attribution rules are applied to section 302 (b) (1)
estate, the problem can be circumvented by making inter vivos gifts of
stock to these people. This will not work in the present case, how-
ever, because gifts to the son or daughter will be attributed through
the mother to the estate. See A.J. CASNa, EsTATE PLAM.NNG 133 (3d ed.
1961).
20. See Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962)
(business purpose as separate test); Bradbury v. Conmnissioner, 298
F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962) (business purpose as important element of net
effect test); Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (net
effect test enunciated).
21. Relevant factors under the net effect test include: past dividend
history; amount of earnings available for dividends; whether the stock-
holder or the corporation initiated the redemption; whether there was a
tax avoidance motive; whether redemption amounted to partial liquida-
tion; and whether redemption caused significant control change. These
factors are set forth and discussed in N ote, Stock Redemptions From
Close Family Corporations Under Section 302, 47 MiNx. L. REv. 853,
859-62 (1963).
22. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Roberts, 203 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1953);
Samuel H. Kessner, 26 T.C. 1046 (1956), aff'd, 248 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.
1957).
23. The case of Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71 (1960), is instructive
in this regard. Lewis was majority shareholder of a family corporation.
His sons-in-law owned all the other outstanding shares, and his daugh-
ters were the beneficiaries of his estate. Upon Lewis' death, the cor-
poration redeemed a portion of the stock held by the estate. The
attribution rules caused the shares of the sons-in-law to be attributed to
the daughters and, since they were the beneficiaries of the estate, the
shares were attributed to the estate. The result was that both before
and after the redemption, the estate owned 100% of corporate control.
Thus, the redemption was deemed to be a pro rata distribution essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
This application of § 318 (a) to § 302(b) (1) has since been reaffirmed.
Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962); Bradbury v.
Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962). But cf. Davis v. United
States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967). See note 24 infra.
1026 [Vol. 52:1019
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the result is similar to that demonstrated in the discussion of
the substantially disproportionate test. Because the son's stock
is attributed through his mother to the estate, the estate never
loses voting control. 24 Consequently, despite X's large percen-
tage increase in control, there is a high probability that the net
effect of the redemption of testator's stock would be called
essentially pro rata and deemed a dividend.25
When a redemption fails to qualify for capital gain treatment
under any of the provisions of section 302(a), section 301(c) 28
controls taxation of the corporate distribution and provides that
any portion which is a dividend must be included in the gross
income of its recipient.27  Where the entire distribution is a
dividend, difficulty may arise in determining the effect on the
basis of the stock redeemed. Treasury regulations provide that
if the redeeming shareholder owns other shares in the corpora-
tion, the basis of the redeemed shares shall be added to the basis
of the shares retained.2  These regulations also suggest that
where the redeeming shareholder has made a prior gift of a
portion of his shares and completely terminated his interest, the
basis of the shares redeemed can be added to the shares of
the donee provided the donee is a family member.29 Where,
however, the redeeming shareholder has made no prior gifts
of shares to a family member and where he completely termin-
ates his actual as opposed to constructive interest, it would
24. In Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950, acquiesced in, 1961-2
Cum. BULL. 5, the Tax Court held that § 318 as applied to § 302(b) (1)
was not controlling where the voting control of Squier's estate was
reduced upon a partial redemption of his stock and a dispute was
shown to exist between the family members and the estate to which
their stock was being attributed. While this case may benefit those
who find themselves in a similar situation, it must be noted that family
estrangement is a factor of little use from a tax planning point of view.
Cf. Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129 (1966) (attribution rules not controlling
where pro rata distribution was at issue under § 302(b) (1) ); Ralph L.
Humphrey, 39 T.C. 199 (1962).
25. Planning under § 302(b) (1) is difficult because revenue rulings
are seldom given on factual questions, such as whether a transaction is
essentially equivalent to a dividend. Rev. Proc. 31, 1964-2 Cum. BULL.
947, specifically declares that rulings will not be given under § 302 (b)
where the redemption distribution consists of corporate notes.
26. See § 302(d).
27. Section 301(c) (1) incorporates by reference the definition of
"dividend" in § 316. Section 316 defines a dividend as a corporate
distribution made out of earnings and profits. Therefore, a redemption
distribution will be deemed a dividend only to the extent it is made out
of earnings and profits.
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c), Ex. (1) (1955).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c), Ex. (2) (1955).
19681 1027
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appear that the basis is lost.3 0
A possible way to avoid the effect of the attribution rules
is suggested by Revenue Ruling 58-111. 31 Treasury Regulation
section 1.318-3 (a) provides that a person ceases to be the bene-
ficiary of an estate within the meaning of section 318 when all
the property to which he is entitled as a beneficiary has been
received by him. Hence if the testator's estate satisfies the wid-
ow's bequests and legacies out of assets other than stock before
the redemption, she will cease to be a beneficiary and the son's
stock will not be attributed through her to the estate. However,
this device will work only if the son is not a beneficiary. If he
is, his stock will be attributed directly to the estate. In addition,
Revenue Ruling 60-1832 provides tha a residuary legatee has an
interest and is therefore a beneficiary until the estate is finally
closed. This would foreclose the use of formula fractional
share marital gifts to the widow.
Webber v. United States33 casts further doubt on the useful-
ness of this approach. In that case a father and son each owned
50 per cent of the voting control of a family corporation. At the
father's death, the son was the leneficiary of a cash legacy
which was satisfied out of assets other than the corporate stock.
The estate then redeemed all the father's shares. The court
attributed the son's shares to his father's estate and held that
under the laws of Kentucky the estate had a claim against the
son's legacy at the time of the redemption for any death taxes
which the estate might not be able to pay. Therefore, his inter-
est in the estate was not terminated within the meaning of
Treasury Regulation section 1.318-3 (a). It is noteworthy that the
court cited no tax cases to support its position but if its reasoning
is adopted generally, the success of satisfying cash legacies to
related shareholders prior to redemption in order to avoid appli-
cation of the attribution rules will turn on the construction
given a state's death tax laws.
In view of the foregoing, it would seem that an entity buy
out is extremely dangerous because of the potential tax conse-
30. In the hypothetical, testator's stock has a basis of $75,000.
Were the redemption distribution of $750,000 to be deemed a dividend,
the entire distribution would receive ordinary gain treatment, and the
basis would be lost. Katcher, The Case of the Forgotten Basis: An
Admonition to Victims of Internal Revenue Code Section 115(g), 48
MICH. L. REv. 465 (1950).
31. Rev. Rul. 111, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 173.
32. Rev. Rul. 18, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 145.
33. 263 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Ky. 196').
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quences. If the redemption does not fall within one of the safe
harbor provisions of section 302, the loss to the estate may be
disastrous.3 4
B. CRoss PURCHASE Buy OuT
A cross purchase buy out3 5 avoids many of the problems
presented by an entity buy out. To implement such a plan,
each participating shareholder takes out insurance on the lives
of the other shareholders.3 6 They then agree that upon the
death of one of them, the others will use the proceeds of the
insurance to purchase his interest from his estate.3 7
Such a plan eliminates the section 302 quandry,38 pre-
sents no accumulated earnings problem to the corporation,8 9
and the surviving shareholders receive the decedent's shares at
a stepped-up basis equal to their purchase cost.40 Moreover,
the policies cannot be reached by corporate creditors.41
The chief difficulty with the cross purchase plan is a practi-
cal one. The immediate annual cost of a policy large enough to
purchase testator's $750,000 interest may be prohibitive.42  If
the father is fifty years of age and insurable, the annual pre-
34. For instance, in the hypothetical case posed, the income tax on
the $750,000 would be $559,340 if the entire amount were deemed a
dividend, while the estate tax would only be $233,200. See § 1 and§ 2001 respectively.
35. See note 1 supra. Often a cross purchase buy out will be
implemented through a trust. The trust holds the policies and the
participating shareholders' stock, the shareholders retaining voting and
dividend rights. Upon the death of a shareholder the trust collects the
insurance proceeds and distributes the deceased shareholder's stock pur-
suant to the terms of the plan. If this method is used, it is advisable to
provide for termination of the agreement upon the simultaneous deaths
of the shareholders or upon a radical change in the tax laws applicable
to the plan.
36. For a discussion of the insurable interest of corporate share-
holders in one another, see 2 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRAc-
TICE §§ 871, 872 (1966).
37. Where two brothers each established a trust naming the
other the income beneficiary and the other's issue the remaindermen,
it was held that each trust was established in consideration of the
other and that each brother would therefore be deemed the settlor of
the trust for which he was income beneficiary. Lehman v. Commis-
sioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940). The
Treasury has ruled that this reciprocal trusts doctrine does not apply
to cross purchase buy-outs. Rev. Rul. 397, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 599.
38. Section 302 applies only to corporate redemptions.
39. See note 3 supra.
40. Section 1012.
41. See note 6 supra.
42. See note 7 supra.
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miums will exceed $20,000. While the testator could make gifts
of a portion of the premium each year, only $3,000 per year would
be exempt from tax,43 and in any event it is improbable that
the testator and his son, even jointly, could afford such premiums
on their corporate salaries.
The premium burden can be eased by increasing the corpor-
ate salaries of father and son, thereby causing the corporation to
bear part of the cost. Such salary increase is deductible to the
corporation, and where the tax bracket of the corporation exceeds
that of its officers the cross purchase buy out thus incurs less
overall tax than an entity buy out.44 Such a scheme demands
careful planning, however, or the Commissioner may deem such
increased salary payments to be dividends. 45
Another means of easing the premium burden is to lower
the amount of stock to be purchased from testator's estate.40
This can be accomplished through a plan of inter vivos gifts of
stock from testator to his son. If the wife joins the testator in
the gifts, they will be free of gift tax liability up to $6,000 per
year,47 and over a twenty year period annual gifts worth $6,000
will reduce the father's holdings by $120,000.48 In addition,
43. Note 47 infra.
44. See Stoeber, Stock Redemption vs. Cross-Purchase Agreements
in Closely-Held Corporations, 17 J. Am. Soc'Y C.L.U. 212, 216-18 (1963).
45. See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (:1958); Patton v. Commissioner,
168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948).
46. The premium burden may be somewhat mitigated by use of a
split-dollar scheme. Each participating shareholder collaterally as-
signs his policies on the lives of the others to the corporation. The
corporation then pays that portion of the premiums each year which is
equal to the increase in the policies' surrender values thereby sharing
the premium burden with the stockholders. When a shareholder
dies, the corporation's loan is repaid from the insurance proceeds and
the remainder is used for the stock purchase. Unfortunately, the plan
becomes less useful the longer each shareholder lives because the cor-
poration's claim against the proceeds becomes larger each year leaving
a correspondingly smaller amount for purchase money. For a discussion
of the problems surrounding split-dollar, current loan, and minimum
deposit plans, see Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial
Interest in a Closely Held Business-Part Three-The Corporation: Stock
Purchase Agreements and Redemption cf Shares, 46 IowA L. REv. 516,
520 nn.21 & 22 (1961).
47. Section 2503 provides an annual exclusion from gift taxes of
$3000 made to any one person. Section 2513 permits a husband and
wife to combine their individual annuci exclusions and make yearly
gifts of $6000 to any one person without incurring gift tax conse-
quences.
48. Attention should be paid to the respective sizes of the donor
and donee estates. While the donor's estate is diminished by gifts, the
donee's is correspondingly increased. 1E the two estates are approxi-
mately equal, a gift may have the effect of taking property from a
50% tax bracket, for example, and trans~erring it into a 60% bracket.
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gifts in excess of the annual exclusion and subject to the gift
tax would serve as a tax barometer. If the Commissioner does
not challenge the stock's value for gift tax purposes, a measure
of assurance is achieved with respect to valuation of the stock
upon testator's death. On the other hand, the basis of the
stock in the son's hands would be stepped-up only by the
amount of the gift tax paid,49 rather than being stepped-up to
its fair market value which would be the case if the stock passed
through testator's estate. 0
Setting the price at which the stock will be purchased may
give rise to unwelcome tax consequences. If the buy out agree-
ment restricts inter vivos transfers and binds the deceased
shareholder's estate to sell, even at the option of the prospec-
tive purchasers, such agreement normally fixes the value of the
stock for estate tax purposes.5 1 Where the parties to the agree-
ment are close family members, however, this generalization may
not hold true. The Commissioner may well decide that the
family relationship between father and son seriously impairs the
evidentiary value of the agreement as to price.52 In that case,
the basis of the stock in the son's hands may be its cost to him
and not its fair market value on the date of testator's death.53
Thus, it would seem advisable to obtain an independent appraisal
before setting the purchase price.
Following testator's death, the son will want to purchase
the policy on his life from the father's estate. Since the son is
49. Section 1015.
50. Section 1014.
51. See A.J. CASNER, EsTATE PLANNING 943-53 (3d ed. 1961); Note,
The Use of Life Insurance To Fund Agreements Providing for Disposi-
tion of a Business Interest at Death, 71 HARV. L. REv. 687, 691-95 (1958).
52. Regarding the weight of restrictive agreements and options
among family members in valuing closely held stock, Rev. Rul. 60,
1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 237, comments:
It is always necessary to consider the relationship of the parties,
the relative number of shares held by the decedent, and other
material facts, to determine whether the agreement represents
a bona-fide business arrangement or is a device to pass the
decedent's shares to the natural objects of his bounty for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 Cum. BuLL. 367. For
collected cases pertaining to the effect of options and purchase agree-
ments among family members, see A.J. CASNER, EsTATE PLANNING 954
(3d ed. 1961).
53. Valleskey v. Nelson, 271 F.2d 6, 9 (7th Cir. 1959); cf. Helvering
v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 297 U.S. 496 (1936); Mack v. Commis-
sioner, 148 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1945) (taxpayer purchased stock for $5 when
it was worth $10, sold at $9 and attempted to take capital loss).
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the insured, there will be no transfer for value problem. 4 If
X participates in the plan, however, there will be a transfer for
value problem.55 If the son purchases the policy on X's life,
and X purchases the policy on the son's life, receipt of the pro-
ceeds on these policies will be exempt from taxation only to
an amount equal to the consideration paid for the policies plus
the subsequent premium payments made on them.5 6
An additional funding problem may arise because the son
and X will be unable to purchase testator's interest until tes-
tator's death. Before that time, the father may want to retire.
Since an officer in a closely held corporation normally derives
the bulk of his income from salary as opposed to dividends, the
father may want to dispose of the corporate stock in order to re-
invest the proceeds in property capable of generating more in-
come. If such a contingency occurs, the son and X will not have
sufficient funds to make the purchase.57
On the whole, a cross purchase buy out seems far superior
to an entity buy out in the type of corporate situation under
consideration. Because there is no redemption, there is no sec-
tion 302 risk that testator's estate will be taxed at ordinary
income rates. In addition, the freedom to make inter vivos
gifts of stock to the son without adverse redemption and attribu-
tion consequences is of great advantage, since testator can thereby
remove a large portion of his assets from his estate.
III. RECAPITALIZATIONS
The foregoing section has pointed out that the major draw-
back of a buy out arrangement is that it will often have to be
financed by insurance, which is expensive and which may be
54. Section 101 (a) (2) provides that the value of an insurance pol-
icy when transferred is equal to the consideration given for the policy by
the transferee plus any premiums subsequently paid by the transferee.
Any proceeds ultimately received from the policy in excess of this
amount are deemed compensation in adclition to the transfer for value
and taxed as ordinary income. However, § 101(a) (2) (B) provides an
exception to the foregoing provision where the transfer is to "the insured,
to a partner of the insured, to a partnership in which the insured is a
partner, or to a corporation in which the insured is a shareholder or
officer." Consequently, there is no transfer for value problem here
since the son is the insured.
55. See § 101(a) (2).
56. See id. A transfer to a shareholder is clearly not embraced by
the § 101 (a) (2) (B) exception.
57. If testator becomes disabled, a waiver of premium rider on the
policy will allow the son to divert his premium payments to meet
installment payments for testator's stock.
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impossible to obtain. The chief advantage of a recapitalization
over the buy out is that it avoids these funding problems and
does not cause a substantial reduction in the combined income
of the testator and his wife.
The Supreme Court has defined recapitalization as a "re-
shuffling of a capital structure within the framework of an
existing corporation. '"s Because such a reshuffling can be initi-
ated and carried out in a short period of time, a recapitalization
is well suited to the needs of older testators who wish to avoid
the cost of an insurance funded buy out, or who are uninsurable,
or who wish to retire.
In view of the broad range of capital changes which con-
ceivably fall within the definition of a recapitalization, the
estate planner has considerable flexibility in creating a plan
which will dovetail the testator's needs with the tax consequences
of the possible arrangements. From a nontax standpoint, it
is clear that the plan chosen must not seriously impair the
testator's income before he retires and must provide him with
an income after he does so. In addition, the method devised to
meet these inter vivos requirements must be coordinated with
the testator's testamentary objectives. In this case, the testator
wants to pass control of the corporation to his son and wants
to provide his wife and daughter with income producing assets.
With regard to the tax incidents of the plan selected, the
recapitalization itself should be tax-free under sections 368 and
354. It must enable testator to reduce his gross estate through
inter vivos gifts, and it should not give rise to testator or other
shareholder-employees receiving dividends on top of their
salaries. Perhaps most importantly, the plan should not endan-
ger marital deduction gifts to the wife.59
For the purpose of suggesting a model plan of recapitaliza-
tion, it will be necessary to make certain assumptions in order
to narrow the numerous variables which must be considered.
While the following assumptions will often prove to be factually
untrue, they are not atypical and they fairly raise many of the
problems to be encountered in an inter vivos recapitalization60
58. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 195, 202 (1942).
59. Sections 2523 and 2056 provide a gift tax and estate tax deduc-
tion for up to one half the value of gifts made to one's spouse.
60. If testator does not want to recapitalize during his lifetime,
he may be able to direct his executor to implement such a plan.
Whether the executor will have sufficient voting power will depend on
state law. Mnxm. STAT. § 301.37 (1965) provides that the affirmative
vote of 23 of the shareholders entitled to vote is needed to amend
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First, it will be assumed that the testator has no source of
income apart from his corporate salary and dividends.6 1 Second,
the assumption will be made that the testator does not anticipate
retiring in the immediate future, although he eventually intends
to do so. 6 2 Finally, it will be assumed that testator owns only
510 shares, the remaining stock being evenly split between the
son and X. This slight change in the hypothetical set forth
originally will foreclose the testator from making inter vivos
gifts of voting common without relinquishing control and will
the articles of incorporation unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 54(c) unqualifiedly
requires the affirmative vote of 2/3 of the shareholders entitled to vote
in order to change the articles of incorporation.
Dissenting shareholders will probably not be able to block the plan
without showing mismanagement or fraud. In Minnesota, abuse of au-
thority or persistent unfairness toward minority shareholders is grounds
for involuntary dissolution. Mbnx. STAT. § 301.49(3) (1965). But
shareholders have no appraisal rights unless a proposed amendment to
the articles of incorporation would substantially change the corporate
purposes or extend the duration of the corporation. MINN. STAT.
§ 301.40 (1965). The Model Business Corporation Act does not provide
appraisal rights upon a reorganization. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT §§ 73, 74. Nor is a reorganization grounds for involuntary
dissolution.
Assuming, then, that testator's executor has the power to effect a
recapitalization, he would vote testator's stock to authorize the exchange
of common for nonvoting, cumulative preferred. Pursuant to direction
under testator's will, he would then give a portion of the common to
the son and exchange the remaining common for preferred to give to
the widow and daughter. The preferred would not be § 306 stock
because there would have been a simultaneous disposition of the under-
lying common. See § 306 (b) (4) (B).
61. If testator does have a source of income other than the cor-
poration, the following plan is available to him. At retirement, he
can recapitalize by exchanging his common for new common and
nonvoting, cumulative preferred, giving all the common to his son and
all the preferred to his wife and daughter. This will lower his gross
estate by the entire value of his interest in the corporation. There
will be no § 306 problem because he will have made a prior or simul-
taneous disposition of the underlying common stock. See § 306(b) (4)
(B). Note, however, the potentially large gift tax on the transfers.
This can be mitigated if the testator makes gifts of the preferred in a
piecemeal fashion, thereby taking advatage of his annual $3,000 ex-
clusion, but any gifts made within three years of his death may be
included in his gross estate. See § 2035.
62. If the testator does not have an independent source of income
but wishes to retire immediately, he can exchange his common for
new common and nonvoting, cumulative preferred, give the common
to his son, and live on the preferred stock dividends. There is no
§ 306 problem because he has made a disposition of the underlying
common stock. See § 306(b) (4) (B). And he has lowered his gross
estate by the value of the common given to the son. However, testator




thereby highlight the problems which may be encountered in
reducing a testator's gross estate.63
The estate plan to be proposed contains two chronological
phases. The initial phase is intended to diminish testator's gross
estate and can be implemented immediately. The purpose of
the second phase, to be effected when the testator wishes to
retire from an active role in the business, is to pass control of
the family corporation to the son and to provide testator and
his wife with retirement income.
A. DIMINSHInG TESTATOR'S GRoss ESTATE
Vile the testator's gross estate can be diminished through
inter vivos gifts, timing is important. Several reasons militate
against the testator delaying until his retirement to make such
gifts. For one, testator will lose the annual gift tax exclusions. 4
Joint gifts by himself and his wife to the daughter will incur
no tax up to $6,000 per year,65 and gifts to the wife will incur
no tax up to $3,000 per year.66 In addition, testator and his
wife can combine their $30,000 lifetime exemptions for the pur-
pose of joint gifts to the daughter. 7 Over a ten-year period,
this would amount to $150,000, or approximately one-fourth of
testator's gross estate. Also, if testator makes one large, lump
sum gift at retirement, he may be unable to pay the high gift
tax which would arise from such a gift. Finally, the premature
death of the testator would prevent him from making any gifts,
and all his assets would be included in his gross estate. For
these reasons, it will be assumed that the testator wishes to
make inter vivos gifts before his retirement.
63. Some states make cumulative voting mandatory while others
do not. See, e.g., MiNw. STAT. § 301.26(3) (1965) (cumulative voting at
option of shareholders). If the state of incorporation requires cumula-
tive voting, testator will lose his power to elect two members of a
three-man board of directors if his percentage of voting control drops
below 50%. With regard to the voting power needed to amend the
articles of incorporation, see note 60 supra.
64. Section 2503 (b) ; see note 47 supra.
65. Section 2513; see note 47 supra.
66. Gifts may be tax-free up to $6,000 if they qualify for the gift
tax marital deduction. § 2524. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
67. Section 2521 provides that each donor has a $30,000 life-time
exemption for all gifts in excess of the annual exclusion, and § 2513
allows testator and his spouse to combine both their exemptions and
exclusions for the purposes of gifts to other persons. Testator will no
doubt want to exhaust both his and wife's lifetime exemptions with
gifts to the daughter, since he can utilize the marital deduction in
gifts to his wife. See § 2523 and note 59 supra.
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The question then arises of what the subject matter of the
gifts should be. Because testator will not want to give away any
voting control before his retirement, the answer, clearly, is
some kind of nonvoting stock, but whether it should be pre-
ferred or common presents a problen. If the testator initiates
a recapitalization whereby one share of old common may be
exchanged for one share of new common plus one share of pre-
ferred stock, he will retain voting control of the corporation and
simultaneously have preferred stock available with which to
make gifts to his wife and daughter. However, careful note must
be taken of section 306 which provides that gain from the sale
of stock which is deemed section 306 stock will be taxed as
ordinary income. Section 306 (c) (1) (B) defines 306 stock as
any stock "which is not common stock and which was received,
by the shareholder ... disposing of such stock, in pursuance of
a plan of reorganization." Hence if the testator receives such
preferred stock in pursuance of the plan of recapitalization, it
will be tainted by section 306.
Although the testator may not contemplate selling tainted
stock, the problem is compounded by Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.306-3 (e), which provides that "[s]ection 306 stock trans-
ferred by gift remains section 306 stock in the hands of the
donee." Therefore, if testator makes inter vivos gifts of tainted
preferred to his wife and daughter, it will be tainted in their
hands. This will be a grave drawback if, following testator's
death, the widow for economic or other reasons must sell or
redeem the stock.68
Another equally serious problem with the creation of pre-
ferred stock may exist. If the preferred stock has cumulative
68. Section 306 stock given inter vivos to the wife and daughter
loses its taint upon testator's death if it acquires a new basis at that
time. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(e) (1955). Section 1014(a) provides that
the
basis of property in the hands of a person . . . to whom the
property passed from a decedent shall, if not sold, exchanged,
or otherwise disposed of before the decedent's death ... be the
fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's
death.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1(a) (1957) declares that the general purpose of
§ 1014 is "to provide a basis for property acquired from a decedent
which is equal to the value placed upon such property for the pur-
poses of the Federal estate tax." Hence, for property transferred inter
vivos to qualify as property passing from a decedent it would appear
that it must be included in the donor's gross estate. Therefore, § 306
stock cannot be transferred inter vivos in such a way as to eliminate it
from the transferor's gross estate and at the same time remove the
taint in the hands of the donee at the date of donor's death.
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dividend rights, this will most likely force the regular declara-
tion of dividends. The testator has no need for these twice-
taxed dollars on top of his corporate salary. The fact that the
wife will eventually become the donee of part of the stock
does not solve the problem if she and testator file joint income
tax returns.69 Also, the declaration of preferred stock dividends
will divert corporate income from expansion.
The creation of nonvoting common stock will bypass the
problem of testator and his wife receiving preferred stock divi-
dends on top of his salary and will probably avoid the 306 taint.
To create such stock, testator amends the articles of incorpora-
tion to allow the exchange of stock at the rate of one share of
old voting common for one share of new voting common plus
one share of nonvoting common. The testator then exchanges
enough shares of voting common to receive a block of nonvoting
common approximately equal in value to the sum which he
anticipates giving away before his retirement. This exchange
will be tax-free under section 1036 which provides that "no
gain or loss shall be recognized if common stock in a corporation
is exchanged solely for common stock in the same corpora-
tion.... ." Furthermore, Treasury Regulation section 1.1036-1(a)
provides that section 1036 "applies even though voting stock is
exchanged for nonvoting stock . . . ." Testator is now in a
position to give his wife and daughter part of his capital in the
corporation in the form of nonvoting stock on which no dividends
need be declared while still maintaining his level of voting
control in the corporation.
Section 306 dangers have hopefully been avoided by this
plan, though several caveats must be noted. Section 306 (c) (1)
(B) defines 306 stock as stock received "in pursuance of a plan
of reorganization." Despite the fact that the exchange is made
pursuant to section 1036, Treasury Regulation section 1.1036-1
(a) recognizes that "a transaction between a stockholder and the
corporation may qualify not only under section 1036(a), but also
under section 368 (a) (1) (E) (recapitalization) or section 305 (a)
(distribution of stock and stock rights)," Hence the Commis-
sioner may deem the transaction a reorganization as well as
a section 1036 exchange.
If the Commissioner does so, the question will arise whether
section 306 (c) (1) (B), which defines as 306 stock only "stock
which is not common stock," encompasses the nonvoting common
created by testator in this transaction. There is no clear solu-
69. See §§ 2, 6013.
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tion to this problem since the term "common stock" is not clearly
defined in the regulations and is inherently vague in the con-
text of the many types of hybrid securities which exist. Com-
mentators disagree whether nonvoting stock which has no prior
rights or preferences, but which can be used for the purpose
section 306 was intended to prevent, is "common stock. °7 0 Car-
nahan v. United States71 casts doubt on the use of section 1036
cases for analogous aid by suggesting that stock which is
common for the purpose of section 1036 may not be deemed stock
which is not common for the different purpose of section 306.
Of the authority bearing directly on section 306, the closest on
point is Revenue Ruling 57-13272 which provides that nonvoting
common which is redeemable at the discretion of the corporation
at a price which is 110 per cent of its book value is stock which
is not common for the purpose of section 306 (c) (1) (B). But
what the result would be absent the redemption provision is
unclear.
In view of this uncertainty, sound discretion would seem
to dictate that the nonvoting common be made nonredeemable
as well, thereby preventing the stock's use in a manner which
section 306 was designed to discourage. While this provision
will foreclose redemption, it is not contemplated that testator
or his wife and daughter would desire to redeem before his retire-
ment, and pursuant to the present plan he will make redemption
possible at that time through a recapitalization.
A second potential difficulty with the creation of nonvot-
ing common lies in section 2523. That section provides a
deduction of one half the value of gifts made to one's spouse.
Therefore, if in any year testator makes a gift of stock to his
wife in excess of his $3,000 annual exclusion, he would wish to
achieve the benefits of this section. However, testator may want
to make the gifts in trust, in which case section 2523 provides
that a gift in trust will receive the gift tax marital deduction
only if the wife is entitled for life "to all the income from the
entire interest . . . payable annually or at more frequent inter-
vals . . . ." Treasury Regulation section 25.2523-1(f) construes
this language to mean that the wife must have "substantially that
degree of beneficial enjoyment of the trust property during her
70. Compare D. HEmwrrz, BusnEss PLANNING 388 (1966) (nonvot-
ing common stock is still "common stock"), with B. BITTKER & J.
EUSTiCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATioN OF C.0RPoRATioNs AND SHAREHOLDERS
329 (2d ed. 1966) (stock which can be used for prohibited purpose is
not "common stock").
71. 188 F. Supp. 461 (D. Mont. 1960).
72. Rev. Rul. 132, 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 115.
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life which the principles of the law of trusts accord to a person
who is unqualifiedly designated as the life beneficiary of a trust."
Treasury Regulation section 25.2523-1 (f) (5) provides further
that an interest transferred in trust does not qualify for the
deduction "if the primary purpose of the trust is to safeguard
property without providing the spouse with the required bene-
ficial enjoyment." In view of the foregoing regulations, there
may be grave doubt whether the testator's wife will have the
requisite beneficial enjoyment since the gifts consist of stock
over which the donor controls the flow of dividends and where
it is his intention to declare no dividends or only nominal
dividends until his retirement. 3 Although there is no direct
authority on this issue,74 Treasury regulations provide that a
power in the spouse to require the trustee to exchange the trust
res if it is unproductive will safeguard the deduction. 75 But giv-
ing the spouse such a power would probably be opposed by the
testator. Also, if the testator dies before initiating the second
phase of the plan, restrictions of any kind on the trustee's power
to dispose of the trust res will cause it to be included in testator's
gross estate.70 Nonetheless, even if the Commissioner should
challenge the deduction, testator can still make substantial gifts
to his spouse over a period of time within the limits of his $3,000
73. Ironically, testator's ability to declare large dividends as well
as to restrict them may create a problem. Where the owner of con-
trolling interest in a close corporation made a gift of preferred stock to
his spouse, with restrictions as to voting, liquidation, and alienation
rights, and then declared large dividends on that stock, the Second
Circuit held such gift was an assignment of taxpayer's future dividends.
Overton v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1947). Cf. Babson v.
Delany, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9828 (D. Mass. 1956).
74. See generally Reeves' Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 829 (2d
Cir. 1950) (counterpart of § 2035 under 1939 Code); Lewis W. Welch,
8 T.C. 1139 (1947) (corporate control in income tax context); In re
Shupack's Will, 1 N.Y.2d 482, 136 N.E.2d 513 (1956) (corporate control
in statutory forced share context); Treas. Reg. § 25.2522(a) -2(b) (1954);
Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 8, at 10 (corporate control in
§ 2036 context).
75. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523 (e)-1 (f) (4) (1954).
76. Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 8, at 10, construing
§ 2036, provides that the value of a gift of corporate nonvoting common
stock placed in an inter vivos trust shall be included in the grantor's
gross estate where grantor controls the dividend policy of the cor-
poration, if the grantor is trustee at his death, or the trustee's power to
dispose of the transferred property is restricted in any way and the
trustee holds the property at grantor's death. Hence, the nonvoting
common will be included in testator's gross estate if he dies prematurely
and the trust provisions restrict the trustee from disposing of the res.




annual exclusion and $30,000 lifetime exemption.
B. DISPOSING OF TESTATOR'S CONTROL OVER THE CORPORATION
The second phase of the proposed plan is designed to pass
corporate control to the son when testator retires and also
provide testator and his wife with a retirement income. Prior
to retirement testator amends the articles of incorporation to
allow the holders of both voting and nonvoting common to
exchange their stock for high yield, cumulative, nonvoting pre-
ferred stock. The wife and daughter exchange all the non-
voting common they have acquired from testator, while he ex-
changes all his voting common except for that which he intends
to give his son. Although testator only needs to withhold one
share of voting common in order to pass corporate control to his
son, he will probably want to give the son a sufficient number of
shares to equalize the son's equitable ownership of the corpora-
tion with that of his sister. While this exchange will decrease
the family's margin of voting control, it will not lower it below
a majority, and the family's claim against corporate assets does
not diminish. The testator is now provided with a retirement
income from the preferred stock dividends. Furthermore, the
corporate earnings available for expansion are not seriously
impaired, because testator's former salary can now be channeled
into dividends.
At death testator bequeaths his preferred stock to his wife
and daughter, in trust77 or outright, thereby providing them
with an additional source of income. He can dispose of his
remaining common stock to the son inter vivos to the extent of
the annual exclusion, or to the extent that he can afford the
gift taxes, and any remaining at his death can be bequeathed
to the son. In any event, control will have been transferred
to the son. If the testator should die prematurely before effect-
ing this recapitalization, he can direct his executor to effect
the same by will T8
With regard to the tax incidents of the retirement trans-
77. If the bequest is made in trust, care should be taken that the
trust qualifies under § 2056(b) (5) in c.rder to ensure that testator's
estate receives the state tax marital deduction with respect to such
bequest. Testator can bequeath the stock to a trust created during
his life in favor of his wife, and his device will probably complete the
transaction without subjecting the trust to continuing administration by
a probate court. See J. RITCmE, N. ALroRD & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 552-53 (2d ed. 1961) and cases cited therein.
78. See note 4 supra.
1040 [Vol. 52:1019
ESTATE PLANNING
action, the exchange of common for preferred most likely falls
within the scope of a section 368 (a) (1) (E) recapitalization and
is therefore tax-free under section 354 (a) (1).79 The fact that
the son and X do not make the exchange will not prevent
characterization of the transaction as a recapitalization. In
Muchnic v. Commissioner0 a corporation offered to exchange
new preferred for old common at a rate of one for six. Only
two stockholders made the exchange, and the court held that
the exchange constituted a tax-free recapitalization.8 1 Further-
more, although treasury regulations provide that a corporate
transaction does not come within the purview of section 368(a)
(1) unless it has a business or corporate purpose,8 2 the exchange
79. The fact that a transaction falls within the scope of § 354 does
not foreclose the existence of a gift from one shareholder to another
or of compensation from the corporation to a shareholder-employee.
Section 356(f) expressly recognizes such a possibility in a § 354 ex-
change. See McDowell, Gift Tax Problems in Organization and Re-
organization of Family Corporations, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
213, 222 (1962). Care should therefore be taken that the rate of
exchange does not result in preferred stock being received which greatly
exceeds in value the nonvoting common given up. See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-8 (1955).
80. 29 B.T.A. 163 (1933).
81. The Commissioner has affirmatively recognized the Muchnic
decision. Rev. Rul. 84, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 71. See Marjorie N. Dean,
10 T.C. 19 (1948); Elmer W. Hartzel, 40 B.T.A. 492 (1939). See also
Rev. Rul. 112, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 344.
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (1955) provides in pertinent part:
A plan of reorganization must contemplate the bona fide execu-
tion of one of the transactions specifically described as a re-
organization in section 368 (a) .... Such transaction and such
acts must be an ordinary and necessary incident of the conduct
of the enterprise and must provide for a continuation of the en-
terprise.... [A transaction] that puts on the form of a corporate
reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and
the object and accomplishment of which is the consumption of
a preconceived plan having no business or corporate purpose,
is not a plan or reorganization.
At least one case has held that the absence of a formal business pur-
pose in a corporate transaction does not necessarily mean that income
tax avoidance is the purpose. Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner,
303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962). In that case the controlling stockholder of a
close corporation caused a spin-off as a part of his estate plan. The
court said:
[S]ince most spin-offs... concern closely-held corporations, it
is not only difficult but often purely formalistic to distinguish
between corporate and personal benefit. The separate legal
entity of corporations cannot obscure the fact that they are op-
erated by their shareholders in the manner most likely to bene-
fit themselves .... The benefits to the corporation and to the
shareholders are virtually indistinguishable. Consequently, the
courts have uniformly held transactions such as reallocation of
ownership interests between different groups of shareholders
to be tax-free reorganizations.
Id. at 19. (The court's footnotes and citations are omitted).
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under consideration will probably be viewed as part of a cor-
porate plan to reallocate control of the corporation following the
retirement of a major shareholder.8 3
Section 306 poses little threat to the plan because of an
exception contained in section 306(b) (4) (B). This exception
provides that ordinary income treatment shall not apply upon
the disposition or redemption of section 306 stock where
there has been a prior or simultaneous disposition of the stock
with respect to which the section 306 stock was issued, 4 if such
disposition is not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of federal income tax. In
addition, Treasury Regulation section 1.306-2(b) (3) provides
that it is not necessary to establish to the satisfaction of
the Commissioner 5 that the redemption does not have as one
of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income tax
where there is a prior disposition of the stock with respect to
which the section 306 stock was issued. Since in this case the
wife and daughter will have exchanged all of their common stock
for the preferred, the preferred received by the wife and daugh-
ter should not encounter section 306 difficulties if subsequently
redeemed or sold.86 If testator gives all his common stock to
83. See Marjorie N. Dean, 10 T.C. 19 (1948); Elmer W. Hartzel,
40 B.T.A. 492 (1939).
84. The family and entity attribution rules do not apply under
§ 306(b) (4) (B) in determining whether there has been a prior or
simultaneous disposition. Section 318(a) provides that the attribution
rules shall apply only where they are "expressly made applicable."
While § 318(b) (3) makes § 318 expressly applicable to § 306(a) (1) (A),
it does not mention § 306 (b) (4) (B).
85. Section 306 (b) (4) (A) provides that any disposition of § 306
stock, regardless of whether there has been a prior disposition of the
stock with respect to which it was issued, shall not receive ordinary
income treatment if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secre-
tary that it was not made in pursuance of a plan of tax avoidance.
Theoretically, at least, this would seem to open a route of eliminating
the 306 taint problem. However, the "nonavoidance purpose" test must
be established by the taxpayer and treasury regulations provide only
scanty guidelines. See Treas. Reg. § 1.306-2(b) (3) (1955). Moreover,
the Service will not ordinarily issue rulings in the § 306(b) (4) area.
Rev. Proc. 31, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 947. Hence, from a planning point of
view, § 306 (b) (4) (A) offers little aid.
86. Rev. Rul. 84, 1959-1 CUM. BuLL. 71 provides:
For bona fide business reasons a corporation issued new com-
mon and new non-voting, non-participating, cumulative pre-
ferred stock for all its old common stock in a recapitalization.
[After the exchange, stockholder A owned only preferred
stock; other stockholders owned both common and preferred.]
The preferred stock received by A is not section 306 stock since
after the exchange he owns no common stock, no voting stock
and no participating stock. On the other hand, after the trans-
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the son inter vivos, testator's preferred will also fall within
this exception.8 7 In any event, preferred stock held by the
testator will lose its taint upon his death, since Treasury Regu-
lation section 1.306-3(e) provides that section 306 stock "ceases
to be so classified if the basis of such stock is determined by
reference to its fair market value on the date of the decedent-
stockholder's death... under section 1014."
A primary advantage of the above plan is that it allows
testator to achieve the estate tax marital deduction. Testator
can bequeath stock to his spouse either outright or in a qualified
marital deduction trust.88 A drawback to the plan may be pre-
sented, however, by section 302 in conjunction with the attri-
bution rules of section 318 if the widow attempts to redeem a
portion of her holdings following testator's death. The son's
voting common will be attributed to her directly if she owns
the bequeathed stock outright, or, if her interest is in trust,
the son's stock will be attributed to the trust through he widow
because she is a beneficiary.89 Hence, the termination of
interest and substantially disproportionate tests of section 30290
may be difficult to meet, and therefore any proceeds the
widow receives from a partial redemption might be treated as
ordinary income. However, the not essentially equivalent to
a dividend provision of section 30291 may preclude this undesir-
action each of the other shareholders.., who received preferred
stock owns a percentage interest in the common stock equity
which is greater or not substantially less than his percentage
interest in such equity before the transaction. In these circum-
stances the transaction is substantially the same as the receipt of
a stock dividend under section 306 (c) (1) (B) of the 1954 Code.
87. If testator gives all the common stock to his son upon retire-
ment, the preferred will lose its taint at that time. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.306-2(b) (3) (1955) illustrates this point with the following example.
[I]f a shareholder received a distribution of 100 shares of sec-
tion 306 stock on his holdings of 100 shares of voting common
stock in a corporation and sells his voting common stock before
he disposes of his section 306 stock, the subsequent disposition
of his section 306 stock would not ordinarily be considered a
disposition, one of the principal purposes of which is the avoid-
ance of Federal income tax.
88. See note 77 supra.
89. Section 302(c) (2) sets forth the conditions upon which the
family attribution rules may be waived. Rev. Rul. 233, 1959-2 Cum.
BULL. 106, enunciates, however, that the waiver of the family attribution
rules applies only to the last link of an attribution chain which ends in
the distributee. Since the last step of attribution where the widow's
interest is held in trust is the entity attribution of the stock owned
constructively by her to the trust, the attribution of the son's stock to
the mother cannot be waived.
90. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
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able result. In Davis v. United States,92 the redemption of
preferred stock did not terminate the shareholder's interest
in a close corporation and was pro rata after application of the
attribution rules. The court held the redemption to be not
essentially equivalent to a dividend because a strong business
purpose had been demonstrated.9 3
Applying this holding to the present situation, a partial
redemption of the widow's stock following testator's death
might well result in capital gain treatment of the corporate
distribution by a showing that the corporation redeemed the
stock in order to induce new investors or to plow preferred
stock dividends into expansion. However, the uncertain judicial
construction of a proposed plan under the not essentially equiva-
lent test makes the test a very limited and dangerous planning
tool.
A partial redemption by the daughter would incur less risk
because the son's stock would not be attributed to her. Section
318 (a) does not provide for direct attribution among siblings,
and section 318 (a) (5) (B) proscribes the indirect achievement
of such attribution. The mother's stock will be attributed to
her daughter, but Treasury Regulat.ion section 1.302-2 (a) states
that
if a shareholder owns only non-voting stock of a corporation
which is not section 306 stock and which is limited and preferred
as to dividends and in liquidation, and one-half of such stock is
redeemed, the distribution will ordinarily meet the requirements
of paragraph (1) of section 302 (b) . ."..
There is consequently little probability of section 302 dangers if
the daughter makes a partial redemption of her stock.
Deciding whether the preferred stock should be participating
may be a problem. Because the son will not have income pro-
ducing stock, he will want his efforts on behalf of the corpor-
ation to be reflected in appreciated common stock. If the
preferred is made participating, this appreciation will be greatly
diluted. On the other hand, the testator's desire to treat his
92. 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
93. Also, in Estate of Arthur F. Hinrichsen, CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
271 (1966), the Tax Court gave great weight to the fact that a close
corporation could obtain loans at an interest rate less than that being
paid on preferred stock in finding a preferred stock redemption not
equivalent to a dividend. See Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d
337 (10th Cir. 1966), rev'g 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 147 (1965) (preferred
stock redemption held essentially equivalent to a dividend); Estate of
Joseph L. Antrim, Jr., 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 60 (1967) (redemption of
nonvoting preferred held not essentially equivalent to a dividend).
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children equally will be made more difficult if his daughter
does not participate in the corporate growth. A graduated or
limited participation by the preferred stock may provide a par-
tial solution to this problem.9 4
Another potential difficulty with the proposed plan is that
X will probably oppose the creation of preferred stock. He will
not want to convert any of his common shares to preferred
because he would thereby reduce his voting interest in the cor-
poration. If he were to do so, and at the same time retain
some of his common, the preferred received by him would be
tainted by section 306. Moreover, the preferred stock dividends
will divert corporate income away from expansion thus lessening
the appreciation of his common stock. On the other hand,
there is realistically little that X can do to prevent execution
of the plan. 5
Finally, the greatest practical complication with this or any
other recapitalization is that it does not provide liquidity for
the testator's estate. If testator has no other source of liquid
assets, stock will have to be sold to pay the death taxes, and
because close corporation stock has at best an uncertain market,
drastic losses might have to be taken.
There are, however, several possible solutions to the liq-
uidity problem. Where a section 302 redemption of a portion of
testator's stock might result in ordinary income treatment of the
distribution, a section 303 redemption will not.96 That section
provides that a redemption of testator's stock, to the extent of
his death taxes and funeral and administrative expenses, shall
be treated as a distribution by the corporation in full payment in
exchange for the stock so redeemed. If this approach is used, care
must be taken so that inter vivos gifts do not reduce the father's
holdings below the section 303 qualification requirements. Sec-
tion 303 is available only if the value of the stock included in
94. There is also a danger if the preferred is made participating
that it will be considered § 306 stock because the exchange of common
for preferred has not substantially reduced the widow's or daughter's
interest in the equity of the corporation. See note 86 supra.
95. At least under Minnesota law and the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act a dissenting shareholder can do little to prevent a reorganiza-
tion. See note 60 supra.
96. Providing funds for the redemption may cause the corporation
to incur tax penalties if it accumulates excessive earnings. See note 3
supra. See generally Horwich, Stock Redemptions Under Section 303
and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 10 TAX COUNSEL Q. 117 (1966);
Washington, Can Earnings Still Be Accumulated To Finance Section 303
Redemptions?, 44 TAXEs 43 (1966).
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testator's gross estate is: (1) more than 35 per cent of the value
of his gross estate, or (2) more than 50 per cent of his taxable
estate.
Clearly, section 303 is a limited solution. It will not
provide liquidity for nonstock bequests and legacies which the
testator might wish to make. A hybrid buy out and recapitali-
zation scheme might be beneficial in this respect. The testator
could recapitalize as described above, but instead of bequeathing
the common to his son, he would initiate an entity or cross
purchase buy out of this interest. Since the recapitalization can
be designed to lower both the number of common shares and
their fair market value, the premiums on a life insurance funded
buy out would be substantially reduced, and the insurance
proceeds would provide testator's estate with the desired liq-
uidity.97
IV. CONCLUSION
While entity buy outs are often used to transfer corporate
control in close corporations, they are not well suited for trans-
ferring control from father to son in family corporations. The
risk is too great that the tax attribution rules operating upon
the corporate redemption of the father's stock will cause disaster-
ous tax consequences. An insurance funded cross purchase buy
out avoids the redemption problem and can be used to advan-
tage where the family shareholders can afford the annual pre-
mium payments. In addition, such a buy out scheme provides
liquidity for the testator's estate. Where the family shareholders
are unable to purchase sufficient insurance to fund a buy out,
or where the testator is uninsurable, a recapitalization will
achieve transfer of corporate control without causing a drain on
the income of either the corporation or its shareholders. How-
ever, a recapitalization provides no liquidity for testator's
estate and for that reason works best if testator has a source of
liquid funds apart from the corporation or does not wish to
make cash gifts at death.
97. See Shippen, An Approach Toward Reducing Costs in Fund-
ing Stock Purchase Agreements, 18 J. Aiv. Soc'Y C.L.U. 41 (1964) (dis-
cussion of two hybrid buy out and recapitalization schemes).
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